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The Convention appears to many as both a confirmation of the thesis of the new 
institutionalism on the value of institutions for shaping the outcome of constitutional politics 
(the politics of creating EU fundamental rules) and a new model for democratic deliberative 
politics. From this second perspective, there is no doubt that it significantly improves EU 
constitutional politics but, when viewed against stringent procedural requirements defining 
the deliberation process, some defects appear. Representativity, procedures, the consensus 
rule and the Convention mandate provide standards to measure the criteria for assessing the 
democratic and legitimate character of the Convention. 
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Introduction 
A large and growing body of literature has consolidated the analysis of the EU 
political and legal order under the prism of ‘constitutionalism’. By and large, legal and 
normative theory dominate this field with the effect of paying priority attention to issues such 
as the normative foundation of the EU or the relationship between different legal orders. 
Broadly, and with few exceptions,
2 legal scholars have reflected on the legitimacy and 
democracy of existing order, as well as the prospects for future development whilst 
constitutional politics, i.e. the politics of creating and modifying EU fundamental and/or 
foundational rules and institutions, have been neglected. This paper proposes a reversion of 
the sequence underlying some analyses of EU legitimacy which have focussed overmuch on 
the legitimacy of formal outputs. Contrariwise, it argues that a deeper consideration of the 
specifically political aspects of the process of constitution-making is essential to the task of 
formulating normative conclusions. An interdisciplinary approach that brings the specifically 
political consideration of the process alongside legal-normative analysis will substantially 
benefit theorisation and/or explanations of EU constitutionalism. 
EU constitutional politics (the process of creation and modification of foundational 
and fundamental rules and institutions) have so far proceeded through a mechanism, the 
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs), which ensures that national governments are able to 
maintain tight control over outcomes and negotiations. At all times, however, more or less detailed preparations precede the negotiation stage and a variety of ad hoc formats 
(committees, working groups, wise men reports, etc.) feed negotiators with preliminary 
studies, reports, drafts, etc. These informal but recurrent practices define what could be 
termed the preparatory stage of constitutional politics and, until the forthcoming 2004 IGC, 
they have been constrained within small and restricted groups of diplomats and/or selected 
politicians with little or no publicity as to their workings and scant feed-back from civil 
society. 
The drafting of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union inaugurated 
a new procedure for the elaboration of constitutional rules, i.e. the Convention (whose very 
name was an act of self-assertion by releasing itself from its original designation as ‘the 
body’), and its success prompted its adoption for the preparation of the forthcoming 2004 
IGC. The Convention, followed by an IGC, splits the procedure of “constitutional” reform 
into two stages: a preparatory (deliberative) phase and a decision-making (negotiating) one 
and, in the eyes of the European leaders, this may resolve the dilemma of how to suffuse the 
Constitution-making exercise with legitimacy without relinquishing the “constitutive power” 
of national governments. Re-staging the preparatory phase within a Convention implies 
opening up EU constitutive politics to a deliberative process that, nevertheless, does not a 
priori exclude the transactional dynamics of an IGC since preparatory outcomes do not 
necessarily bind upon “true” negotiators.  
The significance for EU constitutional politics is dual. From the theoretical point of 
view, the Convention confirms the explanations of the new institutionalism concerning the 
mediating role of institutions and the impact of organisational choices on Treaty reform. In 
contrast with intergovernmentalist arguments, outcomes cannot be explained simply by 
focussing exclusively on governmental preferences and power.
3 From the point of view of 
normative theory, the Convention represents a large improvement on previous preparatory 
mechanisms to an extent that may even escape the intentions of its creators. Authors praise 
the flexibility of its hybrid character,
4 its deliberative quality
5 and its value as an ideal forum 
that might become an excellent complement for the IGC model.
6 With this addition, EU 
constitutional politics moves progressively towards a new combined constitutional method 
that includes three different phases: preparation, negotiation and ratification. In this way, the 
improvement of the democratic and legitimating credentials of EU constitutional politics 
moves to the first phase. The positive evaluation of this improvement cannot be overstated in 
view of the greater capability of the Convention to satisfy representative and deliberative 
requirements. 
Nevertheless, the Convention also presents serious deficiencies owing to its 
“ambiguous” nature. Whilst it has assumed the preparatory groundwork for the reforms, a task 
until now usually carried through ad hoc committees, the Convention acts as a pseudo-
constitutive assembly that has progressively moved towards the framing of a Constitution. 
From this second perspective, the Convention shows major shortcomings when judged against 
democratic standards of constitutional politics. Positioning herself within the theoretically 
informed inclusive and responsible constitutionalism deriving from Tully, Jo Shaw argues 
that not everything about the Convention will necessarily be a “good thing” (a perception that 
seems to be largely shared): its workings may be hi-jacked by dominant forces, its processes 
may be corrupted, etc.
7 This paper reviews the Convention against the prospects of the final 
outcome being some sort of constitutional document. No doubt this prospective final outcome 
may make the Convention appear as a paradigm of representation and deliberation. 
  -2-Particularly, a much-heralded argument maintains that the outcome may be binding upon the 
IGC. Whilst this may resolve the shortcomings of past reform processes, the decisive issue of 
the citizens’ final role remains open. Leaving aside the concrete procedures decided for its 
ratification, it might appear evident that a Constitutional outcome would enjoy greater 
legitimacy in the eyes of citizens if the drafting of the outcome respected stringent 
requirements of democracy and legitimacy. 
The most appealing aspect of the Convention seems to be its deliberative character, 
which contrasts favourably with traditional IGCs. Deliberation has gained currency to 
describe the internal exchanges of some EU organs and bodies, such as the Committees,
8 and 
it appears as an attractive model for democratising the EU. The deliberative perspective posits 
that opinions are shaped and tested in public debate and, further, that actors may change their 
preferences when faced with qualitatively better arguments. Hence, authority is founded on 
the ‘reasonable’ public discussion.
9  But the mere existence of argument and reasoning does 
not mean that deliberation has naturally democratic legitimacy. The democratic and legitimate 
character of deliberation must satisfy previous criteria that this paper sets out to examine in 
the context of the Convention. Firstly, the composition of the Convention must be sensitive to 
the very notions of democratic and legitimate representation (section 2). Secondly, whilst the 
Convention appears a priori a suitable setting for guaranteeing a constitutional dialogue 
seeking agreement on principles, some of the procedural mechanisms framing deliberation 
described in section 3 induce reasonable doubt as to its deliberative quality. Thirdly, the 
method selected, consensus, is a pragmatic solution for reaching outcomes efficiently, but 
some democratic prerequisites seem to have been obviated (3). Finally the Convention 
mandate has been worked out in a constructivist fashion. By constantly referring to the 
objective of drafting a Constitution, this has become its obvious task without being explicitly 
so in the written mandate (4). Whilst this turn may finally assert its legitimacy and bind the 
IGC, no questions have been raised so far in connection with the previous mandate from the 
people and, obviously, no connection exists so far between the outcome and ratification by the 
citizens. In the first section, we review the reasons which explain the decision to organise a 
Convention on the Future of the EU. 
 
1. The transformation of EU “constitution-making” procedures 
The very tense and complex negotiations during the Nice summit had the immediate 
effect of provoking a widespread agreement on the limitations of the traditional method (the 
IGCs) for constitutional agreements. In particular, the summit cast doubt on the capacity of 
“top level” negotiators defending national interests and guided only by strategic 
considerations to settle the kind of framework issues that define the fundamental design of the 
EU. Several issues have limited the efficiency of the last two IGCs.
10 The first are the 
increased divisions among Member States and the reduced or minimum influence of EU 
institutions, in particular the diminution of the Commission’s mediating role. More decisively, 
the increasingly inflexible positions of national governments coincided with issues that do not 
produce win-win situations for all parties involved. This was the case, in particular, with the 
issues confronted at Nice (namely, the distribution of shares of power and votes). 
Realistically, it is debatable whether these could be settled through the automatic application 
of a constitutional principle (such as proportionality) rather than as result of tough strategic 
bargaining and exchange between actors. In any case, these negotiations prompted a public 
and political reaction against the Treaty, which was decisive in persuading European leaders 
  -3-to relax a method (the IGC) that “fed the democratic deficit in the broadest sense of the 
word”.
11 
Perceptions of the limitations of constitution-making by merely aggregating actors’ 
concrete choices and preferences coincided and contrasted with the smooth and solemn 
preparation and, subsequently, proclamation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. This had 
the effect of translating a very positive perception of the outcome to the actual the method 
itself followed to draw up the Charter (despite its shortcomings and many criticisms). 
Notwithstanding some initial scepticism, and even criticism, the comparison between the IGC 
and the Convention turned to the latter’s advantage
12 and it appeared as an alternative to 
traditional diplomatic negotiations.
13 National governments, in particular, have seemed to 
concede the vices of traditional IGCs, the agendas of which derive from unsettled issues plus 
those items that national governments themselves wish to include in order to reach an 
agreement. The possibility of veto grants a lot of room for national governments to pursue 
goals of their own. Against this background, outcomes do not follow a logic of deliberation 
but a logic of exchange and bargaining. Moreover, since parties seek to anticipate the future 
consequences of the constitutional provisions (for instance, the calculus of possible majorities 
following a given distribution of votes), the outcomes in each round of reform end up 
specifically tailored to suit the particular requirements of states and/or groups of states. This is 
not necessarily the best path or even a path to reach agreement on constitutional principles 
whose settlement might render ongoing constitutional negotiation unnecessary. In contrast, 
the Convention on the Charter appeared as an ideally deliberative setting able to reach 
agreement on issues of principle and EU member states (regardless of their size) and EU 
institutions coincided on this view. 
The strategic considerations of the actors also helped drive the change of preference to 
the Convention model. Governments and leaders from small states resented their treatment by 
large states (particularly the French government) at Nice. In turn, they probably perceived the 
Convention as a prospective more egalitarian forum and their leaders reiterated demands 
(such as that of Paavo Lipponen
14 or the Benelux Memorandum
15) for a Convention. The 
Belgian Prime Minister, Verhofstadt, led the way during his tenure as President of the 
Council.
16 In happy coincidence, the Convention format also suited national preferences of 
large states: some countries (e.g. France and the UK) wanted national parliaments to be 
involved into the process of constitutional reform. France had already suggested an antecedent 
of the Convention, the Assizes or Conference of Parliaments of the European Community 
(including the EP), convened to discuss next stages of Union in 1990, before the Maastricht 
IGC.
17 Successive British governments have also supported the participation of national 
parliaments in EU politics. 
A design that introduced safeguards and a priori guaranteed national governments’ 
control
18 served to gain the acquiescence of reluctant governments (including the French, 
British, Danish and Swedish administrations) that regarded the Convention as potentially 
subversive. Thus, national representatives outnumber those from EU institutions; the very 
large size of the Convention may hinder the emergence of a strong self-organising capability 
and reinforces the role of the President; national governments retain the power to accept 
and/or reject the outcome and decide on its binding force; and they included a cooling-off 
period. Governments agreed because the process was unforeseeable, allowing them to hope 
they would be able to maximize their interests while retaining the opportunity to minimize 
costs at the subsequent IGC.
19 
  -4-EU institutions (EP and Commission) also favoured the Convention approach in the 
expectation that its working procedures amplify their ability to shape and influence outcomes. 
The EP campaigned in favour of the Convention more consistently and noisily than any other 
mainstream player. Borrowing the description by George Washington of the 1787 Convention 
of Philadelphia, the 1997 Tsatos and Méndez de Vigo report
20 called for a Convention which 
can debate everything, can propose anything but can decide nothing. The EP reiterated its call 
in 2000 for the Constitutionalisation of the Treaties,
21 and in its criticism of the Nice Treaty, it 
sanctioned the exhaustion of the intergovernmental mechanism of reform and repeated once 
again its proposal (this time on the precedent of the Charter one).
22 Lastly, in November 2001, 
the EP approved a resolution on the constitutional process that detailed the profile of the 
Convention.
23 The Commission showed its interest in this procedure more quietly but equally 
decisively.
24 Both institutions perceive a comparative improvement of their role with respect 
to traditional IGC preparations since the institutional balance of current provisions (Art. 48) 
favours governmental actors. Both the EP and the Commission have appropriate material and 
human resources, and the deliberative ethos of the Convention provides a good playing field 
for their expertise on EU politics.  
 
2. Composition of the Convention: representation and legitimacy 
In their criticism of the democratic shortcomings of comitocracy, Eriksen and Fossum 
accurately criticise its lack of representativity. Democratic deliberation distinguishes itself 
from deliberation as a rational procedure for seeking agreement on the common good in it 
presupposes that the people directly or indirectly elect the deliberating subjects for that 
purpose. Following Sustein, these authors argue that representation may be seen as a 
precondition for political rationality as it secures institutional forums in which elected 
members of constituencies can peacefully and co-operatively seek alternatives and solve 
conflicts on a broader basis.
25  Taking these preconditions into account, the capability and 
suitability of the Convention to legitimate outcomes derives largely from the quality of its 
members as legitimate representatives. Several criteria determine this quality: the selection 
procedure, the territorial levels represented, equality among parties, and the representativeness 
of conventioneers. 
 
a. Selection procedure: Nomination of conventioneers avoided a specific electoral 
process. The European Council decided to include appointed representatives of European 
peoples from a range of bodies in addition to the representatives of the Heads of State and/or 
Government, and each agency chose its own selection procedures, which differed greatly in 
transparency. The combination of diplomatic and political actors that resulted helped to 
circumvent an exclusively negotiating setting and steer it towards a more deliberative one. 
Additionally, the very large size of the Convention (the 105 members doubled de facto 
because of the progressive incorporation of alternates as full members) enlarged the possible 
number of alliances and, in this way, provides a mechanism for circumventing deadlocks. 
The appointment mechanism raises two difficulties. Firstly, despite formal personal 
autonomy (see below), Convention members depend on their nominating institutions and 
political shifts create changes that affect the stability of the composition (particularly in the 
case of national representatives). Secondly, in the absence of a “finalist” mandate (for 
instance, a constitutional mandate) from the people, reasonable doubts may be raised as to 
their legitimacy as representatives although this will depend very much on the kind of 
  -5-outcome that the Convention finally produces. In particular, a constitution-like outcome may 
face the objections of defenders of a theoretical view of “constituent power” on the grounds of 
the absence of any explicitly mandated body. 
 
b. Two level representation: national and European  
Composition mirrors the criteria followed in the former Convention. Two axes define 
the constituencies represented by Convention members: the territorial level providing 
representatives and the body represented. States and the EU are both represented at the first 
level, which implies a recognition of the dual source of legitimacy of the European Union. It 
is worth noting that for all the talk about distribution of competences among levels of 
governance and the defence of regions from any invasion of their competences by the Union, 
the third (or first) level of government has not been granted explicit representation despite the 
region’s petitions.
26  Regional presence is in fact indirect through the representatives of a 
Union institution (the Committee of Regions) and only with the status of observers. Whilst 
federal states (Austria, Germany and Belgium) wanted regions with legislative powers to 
designate the 3 regional observers, France (and, implicitly, the Spanish government) objected. 
As a concession to federal and quasi-federal states, regions and cities with legislative powers 
have nominated these observers. 
 
Table 1 Composition by nationality 
 







Member states             
France  1 1  (1) 2 (2) 2 (2) 1  7  (5)  2 
Italy  1 1  (1) 2 (2) 2 (1)   (1) 6  (5)  2 
United Kingdom   1  (1) 2 (2) 3 (2)   6  (5)   
Germany   1  (1) 2 (2) 3 (1)   6  (4)  2 
Portugal   1  (1) 2 (2) 1 (2) 1  5  (5)  1 
Belgium  1 1  (1) 2 (2) 1 (0)   5  (3)  3 
Austria   1  (1) 2 (2) 1 (2)   4  (5)  1 
Denmark   1  (1) 2 (2) 1 (2)   4  (5)   
Spain   1  (1) 2 (2) 1 (1)   4  (4)   
Netherlands   1  (1) 2 (2) 1 (0)   4  (3)   
Finland   1  (1) 2 (2) 0 (2)   3  (5)  2 
Ireland   1  (1) 2 (2) 0 (1)   (1) 3  (5)   
Greece   1  (1) 2 (2) 0 (0)   3  (3)   
Luxembourg   1  (1) 2 (2) 0 (0)   3  (3)   
Sweden   1  (1) 2 (2) 0 (0)   3  (3)   
Subtotal  3 15  (15) 30 (30) 16 (16) 2 (2) 66 (63)  13 
           
All candidate 
countries 
 1  (1) 2 (2) 3  (3)   
Subtotal   13  (13) 26 (26) 39 (39)  
          
Total  3 28 28 56 56 16 16 2 2 105 102  13 
 
Source: Prepared by Ben Crum, CEPS 
 
  -6-The representation of states combines representatives of the executive and of the 
legislative. This specific shape adopts the compromise reached in the former Convention 
between those that wanted a purely parliamentary body (i.e. national and European MPs only) 
–France- and these who wanted the inclusion of representatives from national governments 
(UK and Germany),
27 although the latter, strictly speaking, are personal representatives of the 
Heads of State or Government.
28 Representatives of national parliaments secure a link with 
the negotiating and decision-making stage, whilst the direct participation of national 
parliaments provides for an input of legitimacy (given the consensus on this issue within the 
EU). The latter form the largest group within the Convention
29 although it is obviously the 
least cohesive. Lacking the capability to act as a single body, a common culture or, personal 
assistants in Brussels, they are overburdened with commitments which, as was observed in 
the experience of the first convention, may make them prone to defection.
30  
Representatives of states outweigh representatives from EU institutions (which could 
be considered the representatives of the European people) 4 to 1. Even though this imbalance 
constructed a safeguard for national concerns, it does not translate automatically into a 
predominance of behaviour that strictly follows the logic of national interests. Rather, EU 
institutions benefit from the kind of “community skills” required for operating within the 
Convention setting. Members from EU institutions know each other and they are used to 
working within the trans-national environment on the same kind of issues. Direct personal 
knowledge and shared experience eases the creation of networks in which they may well be 
able to impose the prevalence of the “EU ethos” over a tight style of defence of national 
interests. Furthermore, some national government and national parliament representatives are 
former and/or current incumbents of EU posts. Thus, the representatives of the Spanish and 
Greek presidencies are or were MEPs and the representative of the Danish one is a former 
commissioner. This is fertile ground for the emergence of a significant comparative capacity 
on the part of both the Commission and the EP to shape proceedings and debates. They have 
expertise and a deep knowledge of EU affairs; they have material resources (background 
documents, staff, etc.); and both may more easily behave as a coherent group.
31 The EP and 
the Commission debate the issues discussed in the Convention internally and these internal 
processes feed their representatives with skilful arguments and documents. Both have specific 
strategies with clear goals: the Commission aims at “promoting the Community method in a 
legitimate, transparent and dialectic confrontation”.
32 An additional leverage argument derives 
from their comparatively better presence in the Convention organs with 4 out of 12 members 
of the Presidium
33 and the chair in 4 out of 10 Working Groups (which is particularly 
important given the power of the chairperson to set the agenda). 
A number of factors reinforce the role of the EP. Firstly, its delegation had the 
advantage of continuity. Seven of the MEPs had been already members of the first convention 
(including the Chairman of the delegation, Méndez de Vigo who was to become a member of 
the Presidium in the second convention). Two other full members of the first convention 
became alternates and another alternate has repeated. In more practical terms, MEPs can 
devote more time and resources to the Convention than national representatives. A large 
number of preparatory documents back the MEPs and the EP regularly feeds the Convention 
with new material. 
The Commission has consolidated its central role, both in terms of posts and the 
ability to shape debate starting from an initial marginal position at the first convention (in 
which it was initially to be included as a mere observer). The two Commissioners participate 
  -7-in the Presidium and both chaired working groups and contact groups. Commissioner 
Vitorino repeated as a Convention member and, no doubt, he has benefited from the previous 
experience. Whilst in the first convention the Commission acted as a kind of legal 
watchdog,
34 it has now adopted a more proactive role submitting regular contributions, and 
Commissioners have taken an active part in debates. Additionally, the support it has lent to 
the Secretariat of the Convention (in the preparation of documents) has added to the 
Commission’s influence. However, internal skirmishes (for instance, the unilateral 
presentation by Romano Prodi of a draft constitution and the angry reactions that followed) 
revealed a lack of cohesiveness in Commission views.  
 
c. Representation of States: the principle of equality The representation of States has 
materialised around a basic principle of equality in representation both regarding their relative 
territorial size and population, and between current and would-be members (Turkey included). 
Also, national debates in applicant countries will be considered on an equal footing with those 
in current Member states.  
However, the original procedural rules introduced some inequalities between the two 
categories. Thus, candidates cannot prevent any consensus that may emerge among current 
members. Given the uncertainty surrounding the future status of applicant countries, this 
could be presented as a fair safeguard although it also expresses some certain clubishness with 
current rules serving to distribute gains between current members and while shifting costs to 
would-be members. In any case, candidates do not necessarily share a priori common tastes 
on the future constitutional shape of the Union, leaving aside any mechanism attempting to 
sideline them. Since the issues at stake are basically matters of principle, though, gains and 
costs do not derive immediately from the fixing constitutional rules. Also, any final result that 
clearly discriminated between current and applicant members would represent a failure for the 
process. 
The Convention redressed some other initial procedural and organisational 
inequalities. The Presidium accepted the candidates’ request to have at least one 
representative on the Presidium, which implied a partial modification of the design of the 
Laeken Council. This representative has the status of invitee to the meetings.
35 Pursuing 
equality of treatment, the Secretariat hired a national from each of the candidate countries. 
However, they did not obtain similar logistic support and the equal linguistic regime they had 
asked for (see below at 15) 
 
d. Representativeness: whom do conventioneers represent? 
The Convention model favours the emergence of political (i.e. ideological) filiations 
next to the diplomatic profile. Political parties were not part of the explicit pattern of 
representation chosen. Unavoidably, though, European parties have become very active and 
the ELRD, the PPE-ED and the PSE organized meetings with all their members in the 
convention (including commissioners, national MPs and MEPs). They have also submitted 
documents containing consensual proposals
36 that may assist in the articulation of ideological 
debate. This possibility cannot be overemphasised. On the one hand, wide differences 
between national parties prevent the emergence of agreement on decisive issues, and 
proposals were vague and generic. On the other, leaders have shown a marked preference for 
alternative settings for party coordination. Thus, the PPE drafted a constitutional project (A 
Constitution for a strong Europe) outside the Convention scheme. The project, written by 
  -8-Wilfried Martens and Wolfgang Schäuble, was submitted congress of the PPE held in Lisbon 
in October 2002. Previously, Italian premier S. Berlusconi convoked seven demo-Christian 
prime ministers from EU member states to discuss the project. This initiative, according to 
Schäuble, followed the Spanish Prime Minister’s active lobbying for a gathering of leaders 
once the Convention entered a decisive phase, in order to discuss some issues in petit 
committee (sic).
37 
A priori, party representation secures a wide and plural source of inputs, but the 
pattern within the Convention shows a leaning towards the two largest groups (see table 2 
below). The two main cleavages in EU politics (Europeanist/Euroskeptics and right/left) are 
represented (although Giscard and the Euroskeptics themselves have noticed and complained 
respectively of their under-representation) together with a variety of other concerns.  
 
Table 2 Composition by party affiliation 
 
 Presidency  Govern.  Rep’s National  MP’s MEP's  European 
Commission 
Total 
PES 1  3  (20%)  13 (43%)  5 (31%)  1  23  (35%) 
EPP 2  4  (27%)  11 (37%)  6 (38%)  1  24  (36%) 
ELDR   3  (20%)  4 (13%)  1 (6%)   8  (12%) 
UEN   2  (13%)  1 (3%)  1 (6%)   4  (6%) 
GRN   1  (7%)    1 (6%)   2  (3%) 
GUE/NGL        1  (6%)    1  (2%) 
EDD        1  (6%)    1  (2%) 
FPÖ       1 (3%)       1  (2%) 
N/A / EPP *    1 (7%)            1 (2%) 
N/A / PES *    1 (7%)            1 (2%) 
Total  3 15  (100%) 30 (100%) 16 (100%) 2 66  (100%)
* N/A means not formally attached, but party group of heads of state indicated. 
Source: Elaborated by Ben Crum, CEPS. Data as December,10 2002 
 
In other respects, though, the Convention shows a remarkably low degree of 
representativeness. From the gender point of view, it has just 17 women out of 104 full 
members (16.35%) improving marginally on the first convention (15%), but this ratio worsens 
if directing positions are taken into account.  Only two women belonged to the Presidium (out 
of 12 members) and just one of them chaired one of the working groups (Gisella Stuart). 
Noticing this situation, Giscard wrote: Elles compensent cette situation d’inferiorité 
numérique par la forte personalité de beaucoup d’entre elles (sic).
38 Nor does the Convention 
accurately reflect the multicultural reality of many existing Member States with virtually no 
presence of minorities. It is impossible not to agree with Jo Shaw when she argues that these 
absences contradict the very constitutional objective of protecting minorities against the 
tyranny of the majority and ensuring that vulnerable groups receive enforceable protection.
39 
 
3. Framing deliberation: Convention procedures 
The move from “preparatory body” towards a kind of “constitutional assembly” 
derives also from the qualitatively different procedures adopted by the Convention vis-à-vis 
traditional negotiations. The “assembly” profile leads almost naturally to deliberation. In this 
regard, Magnette, following Elster, has argued that a deliberative effect is visible in three 
elements: the “de-legitimation” of situated interests (i.e. representatives rarely speak on behalf 
  -9-of their respective bodies), the domination of a pragmatic discursive register and the absence 
of rigid and stable groups.
40 This, no doubt, will provide the eventual outcome with a veneer 
of broader legitimacy. 
However, democratically legitimate deliberation must be secured a priori by objective 
and explicit rules that frame discourse.
41 The procedural features that frame discussion 
processes and the exchange of views, such as autonomy (of persons, rules and organs), the 
publicity and transparency of debates and the accessibility of demands from civil society 
define the democratic value of deliberation. Some authors have noticed that the mandate 
contained certain “safety features” (such as the election of the Chairman or the time limits 
imposed), providing protection against a bias towards a “strong” constitutional character.
42  In 
fact, commentators recognise that deliberation has emerged thanks to the renegotiation of the 
rules imposed by mandate.
43 The driving argument in this section is that rules securing values 
such as equal and free speech should not be a by-product of internal management of 
procedural rules. 
 
a.  Personal autonomy The precedent of the first Convention shows that autonomy is 
essential for vigorous deliberation to emerge,
44 and, in fact, this is one of the 
clearest differences from classical negotiations with tightly mandated delegates. 
No official document defines the status of the members of the Convention vis-à-
vis their nominating institution and this vacuum allows divergence on the 
interpretation of the autonomy of members. Thus, Giscard disliked the term 
“representatives” and he favoured the very precise “conventioneers” (which lacks 
any connotation of “mandate”).
45 He stimulated what has been called the 
‘Convention spirit’, a loosely defined collaborative attitude aimed at finding 
common ground and avoiding a tight defence of national and/or institutional 
interests. Some of the procedural measures, for instance interventions upon 
request instead of representing groups and/or nationalities, or the seating pattern, 
clearly pointed in this direction. Not all actors shared this view, which favoured 
personal autonomy: the programme of the Spanish Presidency contained a veiled 
warning to convention members that they should act as true representatives of 
their institutions.
 46  
Logically, the degree of autonomy differs between representatives from 
different institutions and/or bodies. Personal representatives may be expected to 
behave as “watchdogs” of national governments’ interests and be subjected to 
instructions from national governments, even if they claim or it is argued that 
they enjoy autonomy.
47 The description of the profiles of personal 
representatives (of Member States) reinforces this supposition (see table 2 
below). Differently to the first Convention, governmental origin dominates with 
two vice-Presidents of Government, three ministers and three Secretaries of State 
or junior ministers, plus one top level official. Additionally, three lecturers, two 
MEPs and one lawyer are representatives of national governments of Member 
States. Even those countries (such as Germany or Spain), that initially nominated 
a “lighter” representative, quickly corrected by upgrading her standing (the 
Spanish representative became a Minister) or by substituting the representative 
by a Foreign Affairs Minister (Germany). Their high profile suggests an implicit 
recognition of the potential impact and importance of the Convention outcome. 
  -10-Closeness to government wishes may be fairly assumed,
48 as may the 
representatives’ role as gatekeepers of national governments’ interests. To 
prevent any dilution of their visibility, the European Council recommended the 
an increased participation of representatives of Member States
49 to President of 
the Convention, and some observers have noted the leading role of British and 
German representatives in seeking pragmatic solutions and finding common 
ground.
50 The activity of government representatives secures a certain degree of 
control by national governments that may have the beneficial effect of securing a 
link with the decision-making stage at the 2004 IGC.
 In fact, the perception of 
the growing conditioning capacity of the Convention over the IGC has increased 
the pressure on those driving the agenda and making interim decisions to listen 
carefully to the dominant and more resonant interests within the Convention 
itself, as well as being aware of the dissonances that might appear between these 
interests and those which would be expected to drive the agenda of the IGC 
(notably, conflicts between large and small member states).
51 On the other hand, 
their salience infuses proceedings with a “negotiation dynamic” that differs 
subtly from deliberative settings. 
 
Table 3 Professional backgrounds of Government Representatives 
 
  Member States  Candidate Countries 
Deputy Prime Minister  2  IT, Sw  -   
(Deputy) Minister  
for Foreign/  European Affairs 
6  B, F*, UK, SP*, IRL*, 
D* 
8  POL. ROM, LIT, BUL, 
LTV, SLK*, HG*, TRK* 
MEP 2  LUX*,  GR  -   
Retired senior statesman  4  DK, NL*, ÖS, P*  2  CYP, EST 
Academic/ advisor  1  FI  1  MTA 
Senior civil servant      2  SLN, CZR* 
IRL* Roche replaced MacSharry 
SP* de Palacio became minister of 
foreign affairs only later 
P* Lopes replaced Joao de Vallera 
NL* de Vries replaced van Mierlo 
D* Fischer replaced Glotz 
F* de Villepin replaced Moscovici 
HG* Balázs replaced Martonyi 
CZR* Kohout replaced Kavan 
TRK* Yakiş replaced M. Yilmaz 
SLK* Korčok replaced Figel 
Source: Prepared by Ben Crum, CEPS, Data as December 10, 2002 
 
The absence of mandatory instructions from national parliaments 
delimitates the autonomy of national MPs. There has so far been no evidence of 
any different behaviour even when national parliaments have collectively taken a 
position or submitted documents to the Convention.
52 But autonomy is 
somewhat limited by an unavoidable accountability and by pragmatic 
requirements. In most cases, representatives have been elected and, even though 
they are not bound by mandatory instructions, they have close ties and report to 
their original institutions (most commonly, to specialized EU Committees). For 
instance, in the UK, apart from reporting and giving regular evidence, a special 
committee (made up of members of both chambers) has been set up for the 
duration of the Convention. Different parliamentary traditions and prevailing 
attitudes to the EU also define different levels of control and direction and, 
obviously, a tight control from national chambers implies a reduction of the 
  -11-margin for autonomous deliberation. But, on the other hand, close connection 
with national parliaments is highly advisable since these very organs will have to 
ratify the outcome.  
 
b.  Organizational autonomy. The autonomy of Convention organs (which structure and 
lead work) presents a mix balance. Even though the Laeken mandate granted 
organisational autonomy, the Convention has used it to create and regulate secondary 
organs (mainly working groups). The definition and appointment of the main organs 
of the Convention (President and Presidium) by an outside authority (i.e. the European 
Council) implies a loss of organisational autonomy that affects the representativeness 
of these organs. In parallel, their design simultaneously combines organizational and 
“political” functions which are separated in other deliberative assemblies (for instance, 
Parliaments). 
 
President. The President of any deliberative democratic institution (as is the 
case, for instance, with parliaments) has significant procedural mechanisms 
available to establish his/her position of primacy. Additionally, the role 
requires an intangible resource, autorictas, the recognition of a certain pre-
eminence. Leaving aside charismatic leadership, this autorictas derives from 
the election procedure: deliberative bodies normally select their Chairperson. 
This probably explains the role of Herzog in the first convention (a strong and 
respected personality even though he was not a prominent political figure 
across Europe in the same way as Giscard is). Nevertheless, the European 
Council at Laeken broke with precedent and elected the President and Vice-
presidents for the 2002 Convention. This election, surrounded as it was by the 
traditional struggle over EU posts, did not benefit the salience of the 
President.
53  
The formal exclusive prerogatives of the President are rather limited 
but that does not mean he lacks influence. Thus, he inspired a number of 
decisions that reinforced the coherence of the Convention: decisions on 
phasing, the sitting in alphabetical order and his resistance to introducing 
voting. Some authors grant Giscard a positive role in shaping the Convention: 
his conception and choices have effectively turned the Convention into a forum 
not only for deliberation, but also one that aims to find cross-party and inter-
institutional compromise.
54 However, he has also been able to exercise 
influence through the skilful utilisation of his position, which may in the end 
amount to subtly converting his own agenda into the Convention agenda. In a 
number of cases, he has done so by merely appealing either to his own 
judgement or to opinion, or behaving as an omniscient interpreter of public 
opinion and public wishes. For instance, he wrote, Il me semble, à titre 
personnel, que la legitimité démocratique de l’Union ne sera pas reconnue 
comme complete par les citoyens aussi longtemps qu’il n’existera pas un lieu 
de recontre organique entre les deux legitimités de l’Union: les legitimités 
nationals et la legitimité européenne. C’est pouruqoi je proposerai à la 
Convention de réflechir à l’instauration d’un Congrès des peoples d’Europe.
55 
This behaviour can be perceived in Giscard’s steering of the Convention 
  -12-debates, in his relationship with the European Council (reporting) and in his 
public presentation of his personal (rather than institutional) opinion. This host 
of activities made some members of the Convention fear that Giscard intended 
to dictate the key elements of the final document, working closely with the 
Secretariat (…) and in close consultation with key national governments.
56 
-  Steering the debates. Giscard presented himself as a ´neutral’ actor. But written 
records illustrate a number of occasions on which he used his summarizing 
role to rescue his favourite option and bring it into the foreground regardless of 
the support that it attracted in the debate. Summaries of plenary session 
recorded a number of cases in which this happened. For instance, in the 
debates on the third pillar, the summary recorded “a large majority questioned 
whether that division (in pillars) was justified and argued in favour of full 
‘communitarisation’ of current third pillar issues”.
57 But in his summary of 
this debate, Giscard suggested “a pragmatic approach (on the issue of the 
division in pillars), examining without any preconceptions (sic) which actions 
could be best dealt with by which procedures”.
58 A second example of the 
same behaviour refers to the debate on national parliaments. The written 
summary records a large majority of Convention members doubted the 
usefulness of creating a new institution that would represent national 
parliaments only.
59 However, his closing summary recorded the following: 
“the Chairman found that statements by members of the convention were 
aimed at making improvements to the current system. The question, however, 
as far as he was concerned, was whether citizens were perhaps not expecting 
more from the Convention’s work; he therefore asked the Chairman of the 
working group on national parliaments not to rule out an innovative 
initiative.
60  
-  Reporting. The Laeken Declaration imposed the duty of reporting to the 
European Council on the President. The perception of this function from the 
European Council emphasises a certain “controlling” dimension. The view of 
Spanish Prime Minister Aznar acting as President of the Council underlined 
that “a synergetic relationship with the Council was essential since this would 
be the institution that will adopt the definitive decisions on the reform of the 
Treaties”.
61 Giscard has skilfully exploited his duty to report as an instrument 
for further voicing his views. Thus, Giscard did not submit his report to the 
Convention before attending the Seville European Council, although he 
circulated a written copy when he informed the Convention afterwards.
62  His 
report was received with some criticism. Belgian MP Di Rupo argued that the 
report translated the President’s personal view and hence, they (the 
Convention) could not feel obliged by it.
63  
-  Publicising his opinion. The ill-defined accountability and representative role 
of Giscard with respect to the Convention has allowed him so far to air 
different or even contradictory opinions to those of the body he chairs. 
Landmarks of his ‘independent’ stance are his July 2002 Le Monde article,
64 
his speech at the College of Europe at Bruges on 2 October 2002
65 and an 
interview with the Financial Times on 7 October 2002. In all these, he put 
forward either themes not dealt with by the Convention and/or different views: 
  -13-he rejected federalism, which prompted a sharp reaction from the numerous 
federalist sympathisers within the Convention; he proposed (seemingly out of 
the blue) the discussion of new names for the EU (European Community, 
European Union, United Europe, United States of Europe); and he twice 
repeated his proposal to create a Congress of the Peoples of Europe gathering 
both MEPs and national parliamentarians with the task of examining the ‘state 
of the Union’.
66 Some Convention members thought that Giscard failed to play 
the part of honest broker and instead ‘hijacked’ the Convention’s will, 
imposing his own ideas. A dominant perception among commentators is that, 
in any case, Giscard will push for a relevant result (even a Constitution), since 
he seems eager to seize the historical moment to become the “father” of the 
Constitution of the EU.
67 
 
Presidium.  Following the pragmatic experience of the first Convention, the 
European Council invested the Presidium with a wide range of functions that 
makes it the most important organ of the Convention.
68 The implicit functions 
that it has assumed further reinforced its initial strong position (given by the 
explicit functions granted by the European Council). In a tight summary, the 
Presidium led proceedings and provided a working basis for it. Thus, it drafted 
the agenda, channelled contacts with civil society and supervised the Working 
Groups. Observers have noticed, after the first months of the Convention’s 
work, that the Presidium did not develop an identity as a political team or a 
cohesive group and, according to one observer, some tensions arose between 
its members and the President.
69 This relatively loose structure is reinforced in 
the sense that neither vice-president considers himself as subordinate to 
Giscard and both have substantive tasks within the Convention.  
 
The working groups. Whilst the first Convention did not operate working 
groups, the current one created an initial six in May and a further four in 
September, as well as one (Social Europe) in November 2002. Any member or 
alternate could participate in any of group, although the Presidium took this 
decision in order to respect equilibriums. Again, composition does not follow 
any kind of a priori representative criteria and/or result from election. 
Lacking a previous definition of their function, the Presidium and 
Giscard have attempted to define a low political profile for them. Above all, 
they should avoid fragmentation. In Giscard’s words, care should be taken to 
avoid (the Convention) being split up as a result of the creation of working 
groups.
70 Because of this, he insisted, the Convention departs from the model 
of committee specialization characterising Parliaments.
71 Working Groups have 
a constrained agenda: they examine particular issues already identified in the 
course of convention debates following specific mandates given by the 
Convention, which converted the issues to be clarified into questions. They 
also have a reporting task, which is to submit possible options. No doubt, they 
provoked deeper discussions since they are not subject to the strict limitations 
of plenary sessions. Groups would also benefit from tighter contacts and more 
permanent presence, but they were subject to strict time deadlines on their 
  -14-work, a limitation which restricted their ability to innovate and has forced them 
to concentrate on their agendas.  
 
c.  Procedural autonomy. Although the Declaration of Laeken determined the main 
organizational traits of the Convention, this could adopt its own rules of procedure.
72 
In this way, the Convention increased its autonomy vis-à-vis EU institutions and 
national governments. Procedural rules redressed certain lacunae and imbalances in 
the basic design of the Convention, such as the presence of a representative of 
applicant countries in the Presidium. More decisively, the Convention has re-defined 
its own mandate (see section 4 below), its own agenda and the duration of its work 
until June 2003 (disregarding the original injunction to end within a year). Ending by 
2003 sought to establish a “cooling-off” period before starting the IGC, which would 
allow it to distance itself from the results of the Convention.
73 
 
d.  Transparency. Two different mechanisms, publicity and linguistic accessibility, 
upheld this key principle for good governance. As for the first, the open meetings and 
debates of the Convention are a great improvement on the obscurity of traditional 
IGCs. Documents and deliberations are public and published on-line (essential in the 
first convention to increase the influence of NGOs, for instance) but this refers 
specifically to documents from the main body, the plenary. Transparency does not 
reach all the workings of the leading organs of the Convention. Presidium workings, 
proceedings and debates are neither public nor published. As for the working groups, 
their documents are also submitted for Internet accessibility, but every chairperson 
decided whether to hold public sessions or not.
74 
The linguistic regime provided for translation into all eleven languages. The 
linguistic regime for applicant countries, as designed by the Laeken Council, initially 
lacked this virtue. Candidate countries asked for similar treatment to current members 
(an issue which was not decided by the Laeken Declaration). The Presidium opined 
that this was a reasonable petition and it justified its opinion arguing that it was 
necessary to keep public opinion in these countries informed. Initially, this concerned 
the availability of “summary notes” from plenary sessions (translation provided by 
national representations).
75 Then, the Presidium accepted that the representatives from 
these countries could address the plenary sessions in their own languages.
76 Forum 
contributions could be submitted in any language and were published in all languages 
submitted. 
 
e.  Openness: the role of civil society.  One of the most heralded attributes of the first 
Convention was its closeness to society in comparison to any IGC and, hence, a more 
accurate reflection of it.
77 The participation of civil society strengthened the 
legitimacy of the procedure and the outcome. Drawing inspiration from that 
experience, the role accorded to civil society organizations and the procedures used 
greatly improve on the former convention, whilst the numbers of these involved have 
also risen significantly. There are two different facets to the legitimising role of civil 
society and organizations. One is passive, meaning that the organizations and groups 
act as receivers of information and as a “public” for the Convention. Whilst this 
secures publicity for proceedings, it does not necessarily imply capacity to influence 
  -15-them. This is precisely the second, i.e. active role, which makes civil society and 
groups into providers of inputs. Overall, it seems that the role of civil society fits 
mostly in the passive dimension.  
An unavoidable “instrumental” character conditioned the relationship between 
the Convention and civil society and this does not fit well with the fluid nature of the 
latter. The Convention privileged the Forum, a structured network of organizations 
that will be regularly informed of the proceedings of the Convention. The only 
requirement for participation was the submission of a written contribution and this 
opened the door for significant participation (207 groups and organisations).
78 Even 
so, the Forum presents problems of representativeness. There is no Portuguese group, 
very few groups from applicant countries and some social concerns (such as 
immigrants or asylum seekers) are not represented. 
A second instrumental dimension refers to the discretionary capability of the 
Convention/Presidium to decide when and with whom to celebrate hearings following 
the criteria of utility for specific aspects of the proceedings. For this, they could select 
the prospective participants around “chosen” topics. Groups themselves may 
encounter difficulties providing substantial inputs: the wider and less precise agenda 
of the exercise and its political nature may imply that, a priori, groups are not easily 
able to identify direct interests at stake in the issues discussed. This may lead towards 
a certain loss of focus and perhaps towards a more reactive attitude. The plenary 
session with civil society proved disappointing in the opinion of some commentators 
who sharply criticised the selection criteria: a gathering of the Commission’s payroll 
of funded lobby groups, the usual suspects saying the usual things.
79 Although a 
significant number of persons and associations participated in this plenary session, 
participants complained about the lack of physical space and the very reduced time for 
presentation (5 minutes). As the same commentator has noted, the Convention’s 
consultative effort is demand-led. Supply is plentiful but the resources and time to 
digest the enthusiastic flood of materials and ideas (in some cases, described as carpet 
selling) are painfully slight The Convention is open to advice but is not in the mood 
for distracting participation.
80 
The Presidium and the Convention have also encouraged self-organisation on 
the pattern observed in the first convention. The Presidium document that maps out 
the modalities for hearing and/or consulting civil society,
81 argues that the efficacy of 
contacts will depend on the capability of civil society to organize itself into contact 
groups. This has the effect of favouring the most active groups (rather than those with 
a higher profile) and stimulating informal consultation (understood as full access to all 
Convention members). As Jo Shaw has observed, there remains a gap between the 
types of move that the Convention has made towards receptiveness, including the 
Forum, listening to civil society and the Youth Convention, and the creation of a 
genuine public sphere.
82 
However positive the appeal to civil society, the exercise should not confuse or 
avoid the consideration of the citizenry. Consultations broaden the scope of these 
consulted but, as was noticed in relation to the first Convention, European citizens did 
not take part in the exercise in any great numbers.
83 Equally, the prospects for this 
second Convention do not look bright from this particular angle. Eurobarometre polls 
show underlying support for the idea of a European Constitution (see Table 4 below). 
  -16-But this does not translate into an equally positive perception of the Convention itself: 
only a minority has heard of it, and it remains the least known of all the EU 
institutions (apart from the Committee of Regions). Similarly, the perception of its 
importance ranked the second lowest and far distant from the importance granted to 
other EU institutions. More worryingly, it was the least trusted of EU institutions. 
This, of course, may raise serious questions for the legitimacy of the Convention and 
its outcome, which, theoretically at least, assumes a wider receptiveness and a 
pluralistic source of inputs. In practice, the figures quoted mean that any output from 
the Convention is from the outset likely to face similarly severe prejudice from public 
opinion as earlier reforms. Underlying this is the lack of a “communicative strategy” 
by the Convention, which translates into the usual inability to connect with the 
average citizen. Thus, a new “attention” deficit parallels the “democratic” deficit: 
neither the mainstream media nor the citizen-in-the-street appears engaged by the 




Eurobarometer Standard Polls 






(EB 56)   
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Support for a European Constitution  65  9  63  10  67  10 
Knowledge of the Convention  28    28       
Importance of the Convention  39  14  35  16     
Trust in the Convention  29  21  25  22     
Source: Drawn from Eurobarometer data 
 
 
4. The objective of deliberation: consensus 
  
  The mandate from the European Council establishes the possibility of tabling final 
recommendations for the IGC if backed by consensus. Since the Convention eagerly pursued 
the objective of making its outcome as binding as possible, it engaged from the very 
beginning in the search for consensus. What does consensus exactly means? It could be 
understood as a basic agreement largely shared by most participants. A broadly shared 
agreement implies the concurrence of most players and signifies that the outcome satisfies a 
large majority of them. As an example, the Spanish transition to democracy and its main 
landmark, the 1978 Constitution, is broadly defined as consensual. What lends it the 
characteristic of consensus is the attention paid to most concerns of different representative 
groups that share basic and fundamental principles. In this sense, consensus does not rule out 
voting (and in fact, the consensual constitution of Spain was voted), but it implies that large 
supporting majorities are sought around fundamental agreements. 
  The EU Convention has not defined what is explicitly meant by consensus, but it 
seems that is interpreted first and foremost as the absence of formal voting. In the first 
convention, it was understood that the level of consensus required lay between unanimity and 
a majority.
85 But in the absence of voting to measure how many support an option, the search 
  -17-for consensus involves a simultaneous exercise of defining the substantial components on 
which coincident views appear and assessing the existence of a large supporting majority 
without counting. The advantage of this procedure is that it may stimulate deliberation and 
dialogue. Deprived from the equalising mechanism of voting, opinions have to be aired to 
substantiate opposition or support. Also, persuasion is essential to convince participants to 
maintain a certain opinion. Some procedural devices introduced in the Convention debates, 
such as “blue cards” (i.e. non scheduled interventions to question speakers) and “green cards” 
(i.e. speakers’ replies to the former) no doubt produce a certain dialogue. The combined effect 
of arguing, plus the absence of formal voting favours a certain “endogenization” of 
preferences: at the risk of exclusion, preference formation becomes shaped by the more 
cohesive environment in which it occurs.
86 
  However, the centrality of speech provokes inequalities. In practical terms, time limits 
introduced by the Presidium limited the number of speakers that could take the floor on each 
topic.
87 The summaries of debates record agreement by using expressions such as “a very 
large majority”, “most speakers”, “large majority”, “majority”, “many speakers”, “a number 
of speakers”, “several”, “certain” and “some”. The unit for counting is not members but  
speakers, i.e. those that make their opinion heard. This introduces a basic inequality: since 
speakers in general represent themselves (in contrast to representative assemblies), consensus 
reflects the coincidence of speakers (and not conventioneers) on the same or a very similar 
point of view. Because of this, observers argue that voting gives equal power to each member 
of the convention, and hence there is a recommendation in favour of using voting additionally 
to consensus, particularly in more restricted groups.
88  
  A second difficulty with the method followed derives from the fact that, deprived of 
voting, the key procedural function is the identification and integration of coincidences and 
options. The method followed by the convention for these functions of integrating and 
identifying has been a “to and fro” procedure. Debate starts with an issue from a paper 
submitted by the Presidium, stock is taken of opinions and summarized and, again debate 
starts from this new point. Papers (both initial but, in particular, summary) are essential 
elements for this exercise. An example of how this method works is the debate on the 
distribution of competences and the functions of the Union. Debate started on framing 
documents prepared by the Secretariat
89 which were discussed in plenary session.
90 Taking 
stock of the debate, the Secretariat redrafted the paper
91 and submitted it for a new debate in 
plenary session.
92 At the end of this, the Chairman was able to record consensus on certain 
themes, for instance, a prevailing view that, on the whole, the present system of allocation of 
competences was right. 
  The procedure strengthens the drafters of supporting documents (Secretariat and 
Presidium), the more so since the overload of contributions from convention members and 
other origins reduces the capability of individual conventioneers to follow up the 
documentation (from mere time pressures to capacity to follow up all contours of debate), or 
even to read it. This forces conventioneers to focus on the “backbone” papers (summaries and 
background papers). Giscard has underlined that the task of the Conference is not a discussion 
of contributions (however detailed they are) but to reach a global position. Above all, the 
procedure strengthens the Chairman, who has a decisive role in identifying and integrating the 
opinions of speakers. And he declares the existence of consensus from the apparent 
coincidence of speakers. Since he cannot be outvoted, he has an excellent opportunity to 
“model” the substantial agreement, as has already been mentioned above. As in the first 
  -18-Convention, the absence of voting (rather than the search for consensus) has some adverse 
effects on the openness of the exercise and it may give advantage to certain players. 
  
5. The Convention mandate 
 
  The Convention has evolved from an open (agenda) and un-specific (outcome) 
mandate towards a self-mandate of a constitutional kind. By-passing the more or less explicit 
safeguards introduced through its design as a preparatory body, the Convention has 
empowered itself by means of its ambitious constitutional objective. The review of the 
procedures for substantiating composition reveals thin grounds for claiming legitimacy of 
representatives for such a move. Acting de facto the Convention seems to place the burden of 
legitimacy on its ability to produce a successful outcome. This may bind European Council 
members, but the legitimacy of such move will have to pass the test of citizens’ consent, and 
this will mark whether the ambiguous nature of the Convention suited the constitutional 
objective.  
 
4.1 Agenda  
  The perception of failure at the Nice IGC derived, in parallel with the style of 
negotiations, from the kind of issues dealt with. Observers and politicians agreed that the 
mere distribution of votes does not suffice for mobilizing public opinion nor even for 
resolving the problems of an expanding Union. They also perceived that the permanent 
strategic negotiation of packages of specific (and even very specific) items through traditional 
bargaining, pay-offs and log-rolling would risk turning the engagement into a quasi 
permanent revision process.  
This may explain a switch towards a more deductive strategy that takes an overall 
definition of the Union as its point of departure. Reform, in words of Hoffman and Verges-
Bausili, aims at settling “ontological” questions for the time being.
93 The Declaration of Nice 
anticipated four central issues (drawing from the recurrent themes in the declarations and 
speeches of European leaders) and the mandate for the Convention restated these, asking it  
‘to consider key issues arising for the Union’s future development and try to identify the 
various possible responses’. The lack of juridical efficacy of the Declaration may explain its 
relatively audacious wording
94 although, far from leaving the Convention with the whole task 
of identification, the European Council specified four main issues to guide this reflection in 
the Declaration of Laeken: 
•  Division and definition of competences in the EU 
•  Simplification of the Union’s instruments 
•  More democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU 
•  Simplification and reorganization of the Treaties 
Additionally, 56 questions (whose selection and wording reveals certain biases) developed 
these issues. In any case, the Laeken Declaration is a remarkable achievement,
95 since it 
opened up the exercise of defining the Union
96 (although if it is measured against the original 
ambition of providing a global vision of the ultimate goal of European unification, the 
declaration is far from being a success).
97 The only limitation so far seems to be a pragmatic 
approach. The Spanish Presidency exhorted the members of the Convention to stick to the 
issues raised by the Declaration of Laeken. Literally, the Presidency recommends that abstract 
theoretical debates taken up with the definition of artificial archetypes must be avoided, and 
  -19-the need to meet citizens’ concerns must constantly be borne in mind. Giscard took this 
philosophy a step further and postponed the discussion of the institutional design on the basis 
of the well-known functionalist principle that “task should define the institutions and not vice 
versa”. 
  The agenda of the Convention poses huge difficulties due to the heterogeneity of 
issues and solutions required. The first convention benefited from a clear mandate 
(identification and codification) and a defined range of issues (i.e. fundamental rights). In 
contrast, the current Convention has to deal (again) with the Charter of Fundamental rights on 
which the essential issue (once solemnly proclaimed) is a political decision as to its legal and 
juridical position. Then, the largely shared objective of simplification involves a process of 
identification and codification that replicates the exercise of the first convention. Since this is 
not merely a technical exercise, it could of itself be the sole object of a Convention. Next, 
some specific policies, such as third pillar issues and security and defence, require a previous 
task of definition. Progress in these areas seems to be dictated more by Member States 
requirements than by “constitutional design” and, hence, definitive settlements seem unlikely. 
Another issue, distribution of competences, has a transversal reach. Given the dialectic 
character of the exercise of competence within composite political structures, the definitive 
and clear settlement sought also seems unlikely. In short, the prospects for closing the process 
within a single document are questionable.  
 
4.2 Status of the outcome of the Convention.  
  
The mandate of the European Council asked the Convention to produce a final 
document that could adopt two different forms. Firstly, it could adopt the form of a number of 
possible options on the various questions examined with an indication of the degree of 
support for each of these. Secondly, the Convention could draft a list of recommendations in 
case of consensus. As it has been argued, the preference for the production of a consensual 
text that could guarantee the success of the next IGC emerged quickly within the 
Convention.
98 Of course, the IGC is not bound by the results of the Convention. The 
Declaration of Laeken defined the status of the document produced as the starting point for 
the debates in the IGC together with national debates. This represents an improvement from 
earlier processes of preparation of IGCs  (for instance, the reflection group created for the 
1996 IGC), since the Convention embodies a more open, transparent and legitimate stock-
taking exercise. And it is also an improvement on the former convention on the Charter, 
which did not have a mandate to prepare an IGC. However, the outcome from the Convention 
will not have a mandatory character for the IGC. Political reasons militate against, since 
national governments obviously do not want to relinquish full control over the result and an 
IGC guarantees at least a veto on any unwanted outcome, as well as offering the additional 
attraction of an arena for bargaining. From a strictly juridical point of view, the EU has 
limited room for a transformation of the constitutional procedure without a formal amendment 
of the rules guiding it (Art. 48 TEU).
99 However, it is obvious that the legitimacy deriving 
from the democratic credentials (however limited) of the body and procedure followed will 
sharply reduce largely national governments’ room for manoeuvre should a strong consensus 
on a precise text be achieved.  
The second broadly shared agreement refers to the precise form of the consensual 
document. The Declaration of Laeken contemplates the long-run possibility of adopting a 
  -20-Constitution, and this (together with the large number of declarations by European leaders) 
acted as a reference point for the Convention which, nevertheless, did not have a constitutive 
mandate. Moreover, some national governments warned that even though the Union could 
endeavour towards a Constitution in future, the Convention should product options and/or 
recommendations since it does not have the legitimacy required to transform itself into a 
constituent assembly, and modification of the Treaties is reserved for an IGC.
100 The 
Convention has moved pragmatically to a lower level. It has generated, in constructivist 
fashion, a discourse that may allow the outcome to be shaped under the Laeken mandate, but 
in a manner that is also close to the constitution model. In his opening speech, Giscard called 
for a broad consensus on a single text that may open the door to a European Constitution. He 
proposed calling this a ‘constitutional treaty’ in order to avoid semantic disputes.
101 Quite 
early in the debate, a majority of the Presidium declared that the Convention objective should 
be to draft a “constitutional treaty for Europe” and some Convention members endorsed this 
goal in plenary sessions.
102 Giscard himself has repeated the view that conventioneers are 
conscious that the Convention should propose the future Constitution of Europe (or 
constitutional treaty).
103 In July 2002, 18 members and alternates submitted a Motion for the 
preparation of a Constitutional Treaty that asked the Commission to prepare a text to be 
discussed in the October plenary session using the EUI document and the Convention 
debates.
104 In reality, this seemed to anticipate actual developments: in June 2002, certain 
media aired a draft Non Paper for a ‘Foundational Treaty’
105 and finally the Presidium tabled 
a proposal






This paper has assumed that constitutional politics (the creation and transformation of 
fundamental and foundational rules) have become more democratic within the EU. 
Objectively, the Convention represents the most open and representative debate on the reform 
of the EU in its whole history. Success, though, will be determined by its ability to produce a 
consensual document that presents clear options for the 2004 IGC. Success, also, will be 
determined by perceptions of the legitimacy of this outcome. Whilst it is too early yet to 
evaluate these two issues globally, this paper discusses some of the procedural shortcomings 
that the Convention presents if it is to embody a legitimate and democratic deliberative 
process. By themselves, these do not nullify the validity of the possible outcome, although 
some concerns about its legitimacy may be raised. In short, the convention enhances the 
representativeness of the participants in the preparation phase, as well as marginally 
improving their accountability. The selection procedure might raise questions as to the 
legitimacy of these representatives but these would only be significant depending on the final 
status of the Convention. Clearly, a document that merely serves as basic reference for the 
IGC will not need to pass such a stringent test. As for the procedures framing deliberation, 
participants enjoy a certain degree of autonomy, which is essential for deliberation without, 
on the other hand, relinquishing their links with their original institutions. Probably, the most 
significant organisational weakness of the Convention is the pre-eminent position of its 
steering organs, President and Presidium, which have a significant capacity to bias debates 
and even final results. Although the method of consensus adds marginally to the deliberative 
capability of the convention, it seems a priori to reinforce this trend. And, so far, there is 
  -21-certain incommensurability between the procedure followed (debate) and the objective 
declared (a constitutional treaty). 
In any case, whilst conventioneers, politicians and academics alike focus their 
attention preferentially on the possible outcome of the Convention, another complementary 
and unavoidable debate seems to go unnoticed: what are the links between the Convention 
and its outcome and the two following phases of decision and ratification. Democratic 
legitimacy constrained at the preparatory stage will not resolve past difficulties of EU 
constitutional politics. However good the outcome of the Convention may be in deliberative 
terms and/or constitutional standards, it must endure the test of accountability to and scrutiny 
by the citizens. 
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